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Molecular surveillance of respiratory viruses
with bioaerosol sampling in an airport
Emily S. Bailey1,2* , Jessica Y. Choi1,2, Juliana Zemke1,2, Myagmarsukh Yondon1,2 and Gregory C. Gray1,2,3,4
Abstract
Recognizing that crowded, high-traffic airports and airplanes have been implicated in respiratory disease
transmission, we partnered with administrators of Raleigh Durham International Airport (RDU) in conducting a pilot
study of aerosol surveillance for respiratory viruses at RDU. From January to March 2018 we used NIOSH 2-stage
samplers to collect 150 min aerosol samples in crowded areas at RDU. Four (17%) of the 24 samples were positive
for known respiratory pathogens including influenza D virus and adenovirus. These results suggest the feasibility of
employing bioaerosol surveillance techniques in public transportation areas, such as airports, as a noninvasive way
to detect and characterize novel respiratory viruses.
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Introduction
As the number of individuals who travel by air increases,
issues regarding air quality and the potential risk of re-
spiratory infection during travel and flight have become
increasingly important. In the last 20 years alone, there
have been outbreaks of several important respiratory vi-
ruses that have had a major effect on air travel. A few
examples include influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 virus,
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-
CoV), middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV), and emerging H7N9 avian influenza A vi-
ruses. The outbreak of SARS coronavirus for example
can be tracked from the Hotel Metropole in Hong Kong
to areas where infected guests traveled by air after stay-
ing at the hotel [1]. This risk of the spread of pathogens
by air travel has influenced the development of airport
passenger screening technologies at airports. Many air-
ports use thermal scanning to screen incoming passen-
gers for febrile illness. In general, these techniques are
not entirely effective in preventing the spread of viral in-
fectious disease because passengers, either with a fever
or presenting symptoms with respiratory virus infections
such as influenza virus, often shed viruses before they
have fever. A notable example of the failure of screening
methods occurred in 2009 during the spread of influenza
A(H1N1) pdm09 virus, where passengers on a flight
from Cancun Mexico were screened but still managed to
infect other passengers during flight [2].
In response to the concern surrounding the spread of in-
fectious disease through air travel, a 2017 National Acad-
emy of Science report has highlighted the need for
additional research and evaluation of the exit screening
procedures designed to protect public health from disease
threats [3]. The United States in particular has developed a
biomonitoring program that detects pathogens in air sam-
ples; however, this system (the US Biowatch) is known to
be error prone with numerous false positives frequently de-
tected [4]. An alternative response to this need for public
health screening is to concentrate and examine air samples,
using personal or standalone air samplers. This bioaerosol
sampling technique has been adapted for respiratory virus
screening in swine production facilities [5], poultry markets
[6], clinical settings [7], and airports [8]. In this pilot study,
we studied bioaerosol samples collected in Raleigh Durham
International Airport for molecular evidence of respiratory
viruses. This international airport sees approximately 11.6
million passengers per year, or about 32,000 per day and
uses a high throughput exhaust system (including high effi-
ciency particulate air, HEPA, filters) [9]. Our overall goal
was to determine if environmental air sampling is a viable
method for respiratory virus detection in airport settings.
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Methods and materials
Ethics approval and study location
“Exemption from review” status was granted to this
study by the Institutional Review Board at Duke
University, given that the methods involved did not
include contact with human subjects. Permission and
collaboration from the appropriate coordinating bod-
ies at Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU)
was sought and obtained prior to the start of the
collection period. Staff members at RDU assisted in
the coordination of sampling devices during the study
period.
Bioaerosol sampling
Sampling at RDU Terminal 2 took place during a
9-week period from January 10th to March 7th, 2018.
During this time, 12 sampling sessions of 150 min re-
sulted in 24 sample collections generating 72 individual
samples to be analyzed for a panel of respiratory viruses.
The sampling devices were NIOSH BC 251 Personal
Aerosol Samplers that featured two stages of collection
and a polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) back-up filter
(.03 μm pore, 37 mm). The two stages filtered pathogens
greater than 4 μm or 1–4 μm in size and the back-up filter
captured pathogens less than 1 μm in size. Thus, each
sampler produced three samples per sampling period. An
AirCheck XR5000 Sample Pump (Cat. # 210–5000, SKC,
Inc., Eighty-Four, PA) was used to circulate environmental
air through the samplers at a calibrated rate of 3.5 l per
minute throughout the sampling period.
The sampling periods were scheduled during
high-traffic times of domestic and international flight
arrivals and departures. The samplers were set up on tri-
pods approximately 1.5 m above the ground (approxi-
mately breathing level), at two different locations within
the RDU Baggage Claim areas (between baggage carou-
sels that were the focal points of the arriving flyers) and
at each end of the terminal departure gates. During each
sampling period, environmental temperature, humidity,
and general meteorological outlook were noted. At the
end of each session, the location, time, sampler number,
pump number, and run time was recorded for each sam-
pling device.
Sampling processing
Samples were transported back to the Duke One Health
Research Laboratory immediately following sample col-
lection. At this time, sterile virus collection medium
(PBS with 0.5% BSA) was used to soak the filters and
catchment containers for each stage. This medium was
then aliquoted into 2.0 mL cryovials, which were
promptly stored at − 80 °C for future molecular analyses.
Molecular assays
Detection of influenza A/B/C/D, human enterovirus, hu-
man adenovirus, and human coronavirus was performed
using previously published real-time polymerase chain
reaction (qPCR) and real-time reverse transcription
polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR) assays with DNA
or cDNA positive controls and negative controls of
nuclease-free water (Additional file 1: Table S1).
Viral RNA was extracted from stored samples with the
QIAmp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, INC., Valencia,
CA), and then analyzed with qRT-PCR assays utilizing
Superscript® III Platinum One-Step qRT-PCR System with
Platinum® Taq DNA Polymerase (Thermo Fisher Scien-
tific, Inc., Waltham, MA) for influenza A [10, 11], influ-
enza B [10, 12], influenza C [13], influenza D [10], human
coronavirus [14, 15], and human enterovirus [14].
Gel-based RT-PCR assays detected for pan-species coro-
naviruses [14] with Superscript® III Platinum One-Step
RT-PCR System with Platinum® Taq DNA Polymerase
(Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., Waltham, MA).
Viral DNA was extracted utilizing the QIAamp DNA
Blood Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Inc. Valencia, CA), then ana-
lyzed for human adenovirus [15] by real-time PCR (qPCR)
assay [16] with the Sso Advanced Universal Probes Super-
mix (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA). Adenovirus-positive speci-
mens were further confirmed using previously described
two-step molecular assays with focus on the hexon gene
[17]. Analysis for pan-species adenovirus [18] was per-
formed on extracted viral DNA using the Platinum® Taq
DNA Polymerase Kit (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Wal-
tham, MA). Sequencing of resultant amplified product
from both the pan-species assay and the hexon assay was
performed by Eton Bioscience (Eton Bioscience, Inc., Ra-
leigh, NC, USA). Sequences were then aligned, edited, and
compared to the NCBI sequence database using the
BLAST application of BioEdit 7.1.9 (Ibis Biosciences,
Carlsband, CA, USA).
Results
A total of 24 NIOSH 2-stage samples were collected
(Table 1). Overall, 4 (17%) out of 24 samples indicated
evidence of at least 1 respiratory pathogen, with 1 (4.1%)
positive for influenza D and 3 (12.5%) positive for
adenovirus. Samples were most frequently positive in the
4 μm or 1–4 μm particle size ranges with one adeno-
virus and the influenza D sample detected at 4 μm and
two adenovirus positives detected at 1–4 μm. Two (67%)
of the 3 adenovirus-positive specimens, samples 16 and
19, were successfully sequenced using the panadenovirus
assay and were found to be human adenovirus type 1
(NCBI accession number AF534906.1). Adenoviruses
were detected more frequently in the baggage claim 2
area, with 2 (2.8%) positive samples detected in that
area. None of the 72 samples were positive for influenza
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A, influenza B, influenza C, or coronaviruses. Although
not the focus of our study, we did not detect viable vi-
ruses using culture analysis associated with positive
aerosol samples at RDU airport.
During sampling, air temperature ranged from 63.6 °F
to 78.6 °F and the relative humidity (RH) ranged from
25.1 to 60.4% (Table 1). There was no statistically signifi-
cant difference between the mean air temperature or the
mean RHs between the groups of samples that were
positive or negative for respiratory viruses.
Discussion
In this pilot aerosol study, we conducted surveillance for
human and zoonotic respiratory viruses in an airport
setting over a period of nine weeks from January to
March 2018. We detected respiratory viruses in 17% of
the aerosol samples collected. Through our surveillance,
we observed molecular evidence of influenza D virus
and adenovirus in aerosol samples through non-invasive
and non-disruptive environmental sampling techniques.
This sampling approach was particularly important in an
airport setting, where large numbers of passengers either
sat near or passed by the samplers in the terminal or
baggage claim.
This study of aerosols conducted in an airport is likely
the first of its kind in the United States. Our detection
of adenoviruses in aerosol samples is comparable to
similar studies conducted in an airport and other set-
tings [5, 7]. Although respiratory adenoviruses are not
typically considered to have as much of an impact as
other respiratory viruses, such as influenza viruses,
well-documented outbreaks of novel adenovirus strains
causing severe respiratory infections have occurred [19].
Despite the fact that the adenoviruses detected in this
study were detected using our panspecies molecular
assay, upon sequencing, they were identified as human
adenoviruses. We did not find evidence of novel or zoo-
notic viruses in aerosol samples, potentially due to the
high throughput ventilation system in place at RDU air-
port. Another limitation of this study was the inability to
link aerosol results with individual passengers, or indi-
vidual planes. Using this detection method, we were only
Table 1 Molecular results for aerosol sampling four sites in RDU Airport, January–March, 2018
Sample ID Temp (°F) RH (%) Site FluA FluB FluC FluD AdV PanAdV CoV PanCoV
1 74.0 32.1 Baggage Claim 1 – – – – – – – –
2 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
3 68.9 44.5 Baggage Claim 1 – – – – – – – –
4 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
5 72.1 26.8 Terminal 2A – – – – – – – –
6 Terminal 2B – – – – – – – –
7 63.6 25.1 Terminal 2A – – – – – – – –
8 Terminal 2B – – – – – – – –
9 71.0 38.0 Baggage Claim 1 – – – – – – – –
10 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
11 73.4 52.2 Terminal 2A – – – – – – – –
12 Terminal 2B – – – – – – – –
13 ND ND Baggage Claim 1 – – – + – – – –
14 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
15 70.07 39.5 Terminal 2A – – – – – + – –
16 Terminal 2B – – – – – + – –
17 71.4 60.4 Terminal 2A – – – – – – – –
18 Terminal 2B – – – – – – – –
19 78.6 52.9 Baggage Claim 1 – – – – – + – –
20 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
21 77.1 36.0 Baggage Claim 1 – – – – – – – –
22 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
23 71.2 30.8 Baggage Claim 1 – – – – – – – –
24 Baggage Claim 2 – – – – – – – –
Abbreviations: Temp temperature, ND not detected, RH relative humidity, FluA influenza A virus, FluB influenza B virus, FluC influenza C virus, FluD influenza D
virus, AdV adenovirus, CoV coronavirus
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able to detect viruses from one source (aerosols). As the
airport is a high traffic area, and the focus of this study
was focused on environmental air sampling, it is not
clear which people were harboring the detected viruses.
Additionally, as this airport uses a high throughput
(HEPA filtered) ventilation system it was not possible to
determine the effect of high quality air circulation on
our virus detection based on the methods described here
and we may not have captured all virus present at the
sampling locations.
Despite these limitations, the results of this study sug-
gest that aerosol sampling is a useful technique for re-
spiratory virus surveillance in high traffic and crowded
areas such as airports. Aerosol sampling has advantages
in that it minimally interrupts walking traffic in busy
places, is simple in setup and operation, and the process-
ing procedures for isolating the viral nucleic acid is rela-
tively simple [7]. Together with our finding that 17% of
collected aerosol samples showed molecular evidence for
at least one respiratory pathogen and the ease of aerosol
sampler use, our findings suggest that travelers may be
sharing respiratory viruses in airports and other
high-traffic areas. Such areas may, therefore, benefit
from aerosol sampling to strengthen surveillance to pro-
tect the public from respiratory viruses. This strength-
ened surveillance may also support public health
responses to respiratory virus detection by allowing air-
ports, or other high traffic areas employing these
methods, to recommend interventions (such as respira-
tors or masks) to at risk travelers.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. Primer and probe sequences for rPCR and
rRT-PCR. Full primer and probe sequences for rPCr and rRT-PCR, including
references. (DOCX 13 kb)
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